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Do Abnormally High Audit Fees Impair Audit Quality? 
 
By 
 
Jong-Hag Choi, Jeong-Bon Kim, and Yoonseok Zang 
 
 
SUMMARY: This study examines whether and how audit quality proxied by the magnitude 
of absolute discretionary accruals is associated with abnormal audit fees, that is, the 
difference between actual audit fee and the expected, normal level of audit fee. The results of 
various regressions reveal that the association between the two is asymmetric, depending on 
the sign of the abnormal audit fee. For observations with negative abnormal audit fees, there 
is no significant association between audit quality and abnormal audit fee. In contrast, 
abnormal audit fees are negatively associated with audit quality for observations with positive 
abnormal audit fees. Our findings suggest that auditors’ incentives to deter biased financial 
reporting differ systematically, depending on whether their clients pay more than or less than 
the normal level of audit fee. Our results are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This study examines whether the association between audit fees and audit quality is 
asymmetric and thus nonlinear in the sense that the association is conditioned upon the sign 
of abnormal audit fees. We define abnormal audit fees as the difference between actual audit 
fees (i.e., actual fees paid to auditors for their financial statement audits) and the expected, 
normal level of audit fees. Actual audit fees consist of two parts: (1) normal fees that reflect 
auditors’ effort costs, litigation risk, and normal profits (Simunic 1980; Choi et al. 2008, 
2009) and (2) abnormal fees that are specific to an auditor–client relationship (Higgs and 
Skantz 2006). Normal fees are mainly determined by factors that are common across different 
clients, such as client size, client complexity, and client-specific risk, while abnormal fees are 
determined by factors that are idiosyncratic to a specific auditor–client relationship. As noted 
by Kinney and Libby (2002, 109), abnormal fees “may more accurately be likened by 
attempted bribes” and can better capture economic rents associated with audit services or an 
auditor’s economic bond to a client than normal fees or actual fees. 
We expect that the association between abnormal audit fees (i.e., a proxy for 
economic rents) and audit quality is negative when abnormal audit fees are positive (i.e., 
when actual audit fees are higher than normal audit fees). This is because excessive audit fees 
can create incentives for auditors to acquiesce to client pressure for substandard reporting and 
thus erode audit quality. We expect, however, that the association between fees paid to 
auditors and audit quality (fee–quality association hereafter) is ambiguous or insignificant 
when abnormal audit fees are close to zero or negative. This is because auditors have few 
incentives to compromise audit quality in this case. The preceding discussion leads us to 
predict that the association between abnormal audit fees and audit quality is asymmetric and 
nonlinear, depending on whether abnormal audit fees are positive or negative. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1521324
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Our analysis is aimed at investigating this asymmetric nonlinearity for two major 
reasons. First, most previous studies on the fee–quality association focused their attention on 
the effect of non-audit service (NAS) fees on auditor independence and audit quality.1 As will 
be further explained in the next section, however, excessively high audit fees can influence 
auditors’ reporting decisions. Moreover, even if auditors are not allowed to provide certain 
NAS to the same client, as required under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, audit 
quality can still be impaired by excessively high audit fees. However, neither regulators nor 
academics have paid sufficient attention to the effect of excessively high audit fees on audit 
quality. Second, previous research provides at best mixed evidence on the effect of audit fees 
on audit quality. For example, Frankel et al. (2002) report that the magnitude of absolute 
discretionary accruals is negatively associated with the percentile ranks of audit fees, 
suggesting that auditors are less likely to allow biased financial reporting by high-fee clients 
than by low-fee clients. Ashbaugh et al. (2003) document, however, that audit fees are 
insignificantly associated with their measures of discretionary accruals. Given these mixed 
results, we revisit the issue of the fee–quality association, using an extended set of audit fee 
data and a different audit fee metric, namely, abnormal audit fees instead of actual audit fees. 
As in previous studies on the fee–quality association, we measure audit quality using the 
magnitude of (unsigned and signed) discretionary accruals. 
Briefly, our regression results reveal the following. The proxy for audit quality is 
insignificantly associated with abnormal audit fees for our total sample of client firms with 
both positive and negative abnormal audit fees. This result is consistent with the findings in 
prior studies that use a similar method (e.g., Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Chung and Kallapur 2003; 
                                                 
1 Since the Enron debacle and the subsequent collapse of Andersen, many studies have examined whether the 
provision of NAS by the incumbent auditor to the same client impairs auditor independence and thus lowers 
audit quality in the context of earnings management (e.g., Frankel et al. 2002; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Chung and 
Kallapur 2003; Larcker and Richardson 2004), restatements of financial statements (e.g., Kinney et al. 2004; 
Raghunandan et al. 2003), the propensity to issue going-concern opinions (e.g., Craswell et al. 2002; DeFond et 
al. 2002), and news-dependent conservatism (Ruddock et al. 2006).  
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Reynolds et al. 2004). Second, when we split total observations into those with positive 
abnormal fees and those with negative abnormal fees, the results change dramatically. When 
the abnormal fees are positive, the magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals (an inverse 
measure of audit quality) is positively associated with abnormal fees, suggesting a negative 
relation between audit quality and positive abnormal fees. In contrast, the association is 
insignificant when the abnormal fees are negative. These findings imply that positive and 
negative abnormal fees create different incentive effects: For clients with positive abnormal 
fees, auditors are more likely to acquiesce to client pressure as abnormal audit fees increase, 
whereas for clients with negative abnormal fees, auditors are unlikely to compromise audit 
quality. Finally, in contrast to our findings on the asymmetric association between abnormal 
audit fees and audit quality, we find no significant, comparable relation when abnormal NAS 
fees or abnormal total fees (i.e., sum of audit and NAS fees) are used as a measure of 
auditor–client economic bond in lieu of abnormal audit fees. This is in line with the findings 
of previous studies that report an insignificant relation between NAS or total fees and audit 
quality (e.g., Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Chung and Kallapur 2003). 
Our study adds to the existing literature in the following ways. First, to our knowledge, 
this is the first study to document evidence that the effect of abnormal audit fees on audit 
quality is asymmetric, conditional upon the sign of abnormal audit fees2 and that excessively 
high audit fees can impair auditor independence even when the provision of NAS to the same 
audit client is prohibited. Second, if the association between unsigned discretionary accruals 
and abnormal fees is positive for the subsample of clients with positive abnormal fees and 
insignificant for the subsample of clients with negative abnormal fees, examining the fee–
                                                 
2 Some prior studies examine the association between abnormal (audit, non-audit, or total) fees and audit quality 
or earnings response coefficient (e.g., DeFond et al. 2002; Higgs and Skantz 2006; Krishnan et al. 2005). 
However, none of them investigate the asymmetric association for samples of positive and negative abnormal 
fees except for Higgs and Skantz (2006) and Krishnan et al. (2005). These two exceptional studies, however, are 
related to “independence in appearance” rather than “independence in fact,” which is the main concern of this 
study. 
 5
quality association with no reference to the sign of abnormal audit fees most likely leads us to 
observe the insignificant associations as reported in most previous studies. This is because the 
two opposing effects can cancel out each other when the two distinct subsamples are 
combined. Our findings suggest that future research on similar issues should take into 
account the asymmetric effect of abnormal audit fees on audit quality. 
As for many other studies examining the fee–quality association, our results should be 
interpreted cautiously. We consider an augmented normal audit fee estimation model to better 
isolate abnormal audit fees from normal ones. We use two different measures of discretionary 
accruals to address potential errors associated with their measurement. Nevertheless, one 
cannot completely rule out the possibility that our results are potentially driven by 
measurement errors involved in our test variable (i.e., abnormal audit fees) and/or our 
dependent variable (i.e., discretionary accruals). In particular, our finding of a positive 
association between the magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals and positive abnormal 
audit fees may stem from the fact that auditors exert greater effort to audit more complex 
firms that are likely to have higher absolute discretionary accruals, and thus, audit fees 
charged to these firms are higher than the normal fee level. To alleviate a concern about this 
possibility, we control for client complexity when measuring abnormal audit fees. 3 
Nevertheless, one cannot rule out the remaining effect of uncontrolled complexity on our 
results. We note, however, that the above possibility cannot explain why the effect of 
abnormal audit fees on the magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals is significantly 
positive only for firms with positive abnormal fees, but the effect is not present for firms with 
negative abnormal accruals.   
                                                 
3 We include several variables (e.g., NBS; NGS; INVREC; FOREIGN; EXORD; PENSION) to control for 
complexity in the normal audit fee expectation model. A better way to isolate the complexity-related argument 
from the economic rent-related argument is to control for audit hours (as a proxy for audit effort) when 
examining the fee-quality relation. However, data on audit hours are not available to us.   
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section explains 
abnormal audit fees and why the abnormal audit fee–audit quality relation is conditioned 
upon the sign of abnormal audit fees. The third section describes our empirical procedures. 
The fourth section describes the sample and the data and presents the results of univariate 
analyses. The fifth section reports the results of multivariate regressions. The sixth section 
conducts further analyses, including a variety of sensitivity tests. The final section 
summarizes the paper and presents our conclusions. 
 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Do Abnormal Audit Fees Better Capture the Auditor–Client Economic Bond? 
 In competitive markets for audit services, the fees paid to auditors reflect their effort 
costs and litigation risk (Simunic 1980; Choi et al. 2008, 2009). Differences in actual fees 
observed across clients will mainly reflect differences in effort costs and client-specific risk. 
Actual fees are thus limited in capturing the extent of the auditors’ economic bond to a client. 
The use of actual fees as a measure of bonding can introduce nontrivial measurement errors 
in the regression of the fees on audit quality unless cross-sectional differences in effort costs 
and litigation risk are appropriately controlled for. It is possible that the insignificant 
associations between audit quality and various fee metrics documented by previous research 
are driven by this limitation rather than by the lack of an underlying relation. 
In addition, even though some previous studies use abnormal fee metrics as well as 
actual fee metrics when examining the fee–quality association, they perform analyses using a 
sample combining clients with positive abnormal fees and negative abnormal fees (e.g., 
DeFond et al. 2002; Huang et al. 2007; Larcker and Richardson 2004). If the significant fee–
quality relation is conditioned upon the sign of abnormal fees, one can observe an 
insignificant relation for this pooled sample due to a possible cancellation effect caused by 
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the asymmetric relation between the two subsamples. We therefore predict that abnormal 
audit fees are not significantly associated with audit quality when the association between the 
two is not conditioned upon the sign of abnormal audit fees. 
The Sign of Abnormal Audit Fees and the Asymmetric Effect on Audit Quality 
In a broad sense, abnormal audit fees can be viewed as what DeAngelo (1981) called 
“client-specific quasi-rents.” The existence of (positive) client-specific quasi-rents creates an 
incentive for the auditor to compromise independence with respect to a specific client 
(DeAngelo 1981; DeFond et al. 2002; Chung and Kallapur 2003). Dye (1991) also 
analytically shows that audit quality is impaired when auditors are overpaid. 
When the auditor receives unusually high audit fees from a client (i.e., abnormal audit 
fees are positive), the auditor can allow the client to engage in opportunistic earnings 
management.4 This is because, for clients with positive abnormal fees, the benefits to the 
auditor from acquiescing to client pressure for opportunistic earnings management can 
outweigh the associated costs (e.g., increased litigation risk, loss of reputation).5 We therefore 
predict that for clients with positive abnormal audit fees, abnormal audit fees are positively 
associated with the magnitude of discretionary accruals. 
On the other hand, when the audit fees are lower than normal (i.e., abnormal audit 
fees are negative), one can expect the following three possibilities. First, for clients with 
negative abnormal audit fees, auditors have few incentives to compromise audit quality by 
                                                 
4 For example, Kinney and Libby (2002) explain that Enron’s actual audit fee in year 2000 was 250% of the 
estimated normal audit fee. They suggest that abnormal fees are a very good measure for estimating the degree 
of the economic bond between the auditor and the client compared with other measures used in prior literature. 
5 In contrast, Higgs and Skantz (2006) argue that abnormally high fees can represent a firm’s intention to signal 
high earnings quality by purchasing more audit services than expected. They find evidence supporting that the 
earnings response coefficient (ERC) is higher for firms with positive abnormal fees than for those with negative 
abnormal fees. This argument is in sharp contrast to the concern of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission over excessive fees. In addition, Krishnan et al. (2005) use almost the same methods but report that 
firms with high abnormal non-audit fees have smaller ERCs, in contradiction with the findings of Higgs and 
Skantz (2006). Because of this inconsistency in the two ERC studies, we do not formally introduce them into the 
formulation of our research questions.  
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acquiescing to client pressure for substandard reporting. 6  This is because the benefit to 
auditors from retaining these unprofitable (or only marginally profitable) clients is not great 
enough to cover the expected costs associated with substandard reporting. One can therefore 
expect to observe an insignificant or, at best, weak association between abnormal audit fees 
and the magnitude of discretionary accruals for clients with negative abnormal fees. Second, 
it is also possible that the more negative the abnormal audit fees, the lower the incentives for 
auditors to compromise independence and the higher the audit quality (or the smaller the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals). In such a case, one can observe a positive association 
between abnormal audit fees and discretionary accruals for clients with negative abnormal 
audit fees (i.e., there are no asymmetric effects of positive versus negative abnormal fees on 
audit quality). Third, when auditors bear low audit fees in anticipation of high audit fees from 
future profitable engagements (and thus abnormal audit fees are negative in the current 
period), auditors can be vulnerable to client pressure for allowing biased financial reporting. 
To the extent that the discounting of current fees harms auditor independence, one expects to 
observe a significantly negative association between abnormal fees and the magnitude of 
discretionary accruals for clients with negative abnormal fees.7 
Given the three previous possibilities on the effect of negative abnormal audit fees on 
audit quality, it is an empirical question whether the association between (negative) abnormal 
fees and discretionary accruals is positive, negative, or insignificant for clients with negative 
discretionary accruals. We therefore have no directional prediction on this association. 
 
                                                 
6 If no client-specific quasi-rents are expected from a given client, an auditor is indifferent to termination of the 
audit contract as long as perfect substitute clients exist; consequently the auditor has no economic incentive to 
conceal a discovered breach. In this case, the auditor is perfectly independent with respect to that particular 
client (DeAngelo 1981).  
7 Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant (2005), among others, provide evidence of auditors’ initial fee discount 
behavior. A common view in the literature is that auditors expect future fees to rise. Please note that the 
literature on audit quality, however, has shown that neither discounting nor low-balling necessarily impairs audit 
quality.  
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EMPIRICAL PROCEDURES 
Measurement of Abnormal Audit Fees 
 To decompose an actual audit fee into two components, that is, the expected 
component, which we call the normal audit fee, and the unexpected component, which we 
call the abnormal audit fee, we need to specify an audit fee expectation model. Building upon 
the extant literature on audit fee determinants (e.g., Chaney et al. 2004; Craswell et al. 1995; 
DeFond et al. 2002; Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant 2005; Whisenant et al. 2003), we 
posit the following model: 
        
errortermsYearDummieIndustryREPORTABLERESTATE
LAGREPORTPENSIONCHGSALEBTM
TENSHORTBIGLIQUIDROALEVE
LOSSLAGLOSSEXORDFOREIGNISSUE
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       (1) 
where, for client firm j in year t, the variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 The demand for audit services is likely to increase with firm size, leading to a positive 
association between firm size and audit fees. We include LNTA and EMPLOY to control for 
client size. Audit fees are likely to be higher for clients with more complex business 
operations. We include the variables NBS, NGS, INVREC, FOREIGN, and EXORD to proxy 
for client complexity. All the coefficients of the aforementioned variables are expected to be 
positive (Simunic 1980; Choi et al. 2008). 
 In Eq. (1), we include LOSS, LOSSLAG, LEVE, LIQUID, and ROA to proxy for a 
client’s risk characteristics. Since auditors charge higher fees for risky clients (Simunic and 
Stein 1996), we predict that the coefficients of LOSS, LOSSLAG, and LEVE are positive 
whereas those of ROA and LIQUID are negative. We include BIG4 to capture the effect of 
audit quality differentiation on audit fees. A positive coefficient of BIG4 means the existence 
of fee premiums for high-quality auditors, namely, the Big 4. The SHORT_TEN variable is 
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included to control for fee discounting at initial audit engagements (Sankaraguruswamy and 
Whisenant 2005). Firms involved in equity and debt offerings are in a greater need of audit 
services (Reynolds et al. 2004). In addition, the demand for audit services is greater for high-
growth firms than for low-growth firms (Choi and Wong 2007). To control for these effects, 
we include ISSUE, CHGSALE, and BTM (an inverse measure of growth potential). Following 
Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant (2005) and Whisenant et al. (2003), we add three 
indicator variables, PENSION, RESTATE, and REPORTABLE, which represent the existence 
of pension or post-retirement plans, 8  accounting restatements, and reportable events or 
disagreements between auditors and client firms, respectively. We also include the reporting 
lag (REPORT_LAG), measured by the number of days between annual earnings 
announcement dates and fiscal year ends. Finally, we include 12 industry indicator variables 
as used by Frankel et al. (2002) and year indicator variables to control for industry and yearly 
differences. 
  Using the estimated coefficients of the variables included in Eq. (1), we compute the 
fitted values of the audit fee (AFEE) and use them as “normal audit fees.” We then measure 
abnormal audit fees (ABAFEE) by measuring the differences between AFEE and normal audit 
fees.9 In our main analysis, we estimate Eq. (1) using a pooled sample of 9,815 firm-years 
over the four-year period 2000–2003. 
We also consider alternative methods for estimating Eq. (1) as part of our sensitivity 
checks: First, we estimate Eq. (1) for each year after deleting the year dummy variables. 
Second, we estimate the model in each industry without industry dummies from Eq. (1). 
Third, we use the previous year’s data to estimate the expected fee model in order to perform 
                                                 
8 The existence of a pension or post-retirement plan is defined whether current fiscal year plan assets or costs are 
greater than US$1 million or not. 
9 Alternatively, we compute the dollar values of abnormal fees as the differences between the actual dollar 
values of audit fees and the normal dollar values of audit fees after converting the estimated logged normal fees 
into their respective dollar values (by using the exponential function to convert logged values to actual values). 
These dollar values of abnormal fees are highly correlated with our original measures and yield almost identical 
empirical results. Thus, we do not separately report these results here for brevity. 
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out-of-sample predictions. Finally, we consider a percentage measure of abnormal fees 
(instead of the level measure), that is, abnormal audit fees deflated by actual audit fees, as the 
dependent variable. Though not reported here for brevity, these alternative estimations do not 
alter our test results. 
Measurements of Discretionary Accruals 
We use discretionary accruals (DA) as a proxy for audit quality because it captures the 
quality of accounting information in a more general sense, whereas other measures such as 
audit opinion or accounting fraud are only related to a few extreme situations (Myers et al. 
2003). In this paper, we consider two different measures of DA: (1) discretionary accruals 
using the model of Ball and Shivakumar (2006), which controls for the asymmetric timeliness 
of accruals in recognizing economic gain and loss, and (2) discretionary accruals obtained by 
applying the performance-adjusted modified Jones model (Kothari et al. 2005). We denote 
the first and second measures of DA by DA1 and DA2, respectively. 
To illustrate how we obtain the two measures of DA, consider the model of Ball and 
Shivakumar (2006) and the modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) in Eqs. (2) and (3), 
respectively: 
     
jt
jtjtjtjtjt
jtjtjtjtjtjtjt
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βββ
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where, for firm j in year t (or t - 1), ACCR denotes total accruals (income before 
extraordinary items minus cash flow from operations); A, ΔREV, ΔREC, and PPE represent 
total assets, changes in net revenue, changes in receivables, and gross property, plant, and 
equipment, respectively; CFO represents cash flow from operations; DCFO is a dummy 
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variable that equals 1 if CFO is negative and 0 otherwise10; and ε is an error term. We 
estimate the Eqs. (2) and (3) for each two-digit SIC code industry and year, with a minimum 
of 20 observations. 
Our first measure of DA (i.e. DA1) is computed as follows. We first estimate Eq. (2) 
for each two-digit SIC code industry in each year. The DA1 is the difference between actual 
total accruals deflated by lagged total assets and the fitted values of Eq. (2). Our second 
measure of discretionary accruals (i.e., DA2) is computed as follows. For each two-digit SIC 
code industry in each year, we estimate the modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) in 
Eq. (3), using cross-sectional observations. Residuals from Eq. (3) are our measure of DA 
before adjusting for firm performance. We match each firm-year observation with another 
from the same two-digit SIC code and year with the closest ROA in the previous year. We 
then compute performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, namely, DA2, by taking the 
difference between the original DA and the matched firm’s DA (Kothari et al. 2005).11 
Model for the Association between Abnormal Audit Fees and Audit Quality 
To examine the association between abnormal audit fees and audit quality and 
whether it is asymmetric between clients with positive versus negative abnormal audit fees, 
we posit the following model that links the magnitude of unsigned or signed discretionary 
accruals with our test variable, namely, abnormal audit fees (ABAFEE) and other control 
variables: 
     |DA| or DA = β0 + β1 POS_ABAF + β2 ABAFEE + β3 (POS_ABAF*ABAFEE) 
          + β4 LNTA + β5 BIG4 + β6 BTM + β7 CHGSALE + β8 LOSS 
          + β9 LEVE + β10 ISSUE + β11 AUDCHG + β12 CFO                               (4) 
                                                 
10 Note here that DCFO serves as a proxy for economic loss. Similar to Ball and Shivakumar (2006), we 
consider alternative proxies for economic loss, that is, the indicator variable that has a value of 1 for ΔCFO < 0, 
industry median-adjusted CFO < 0, or excess annual return (annual return minus annual market return) < 0 and 
a value of 0 otherwise. Though not reported here, the use of these alternative proxies for economic loss leads to 
results similar to those shown when we use DCFO as a proxy.     
11 We repeat all the tests in this study with the performance-unadjusted discretionary accrual measure, but the 
(untabulated) results are qualitatively identical to those using the performance-adjusted measure. Kasznik’s 
(1999) method for adjusting for firm performance does not alter our results either.  
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          + β13 LAGACCR + β14 STD_CFO + β15 STD_REV 
          + industry and year dummies + error term 
where, for each firm and in each year (the firm and year subscripts subsumed), |DA| (DA) 
denotes the magnitude of unsigned (signed) discretionary accruals. All the other variables are 
defined in the Appendix.  
Previous research shows that large firms tend to have more stable and predictable 
operations and hence report a lower level of discretionary accruals than small firms (e.g., 
Dechow and Dichev 2002). In Eq. (4), we include LNTA to control for this size effect. 
Evidence shows that Big 4 auditors are more effective than non-Big 4 auditors in constraining 
managers’ abilities to manage earnings (Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999) and we 
include BIG4 to control for this effect. We include BTM and CHGSALE to control for the 
potential effects of firm growth on the extent of earnings management. The loss indicator 
(LOSS) is added to control for potential differences in earnings management behavior 
between loss and profit firms. Firms with high leverage can have incentives to boost reported 
earnings due to their concerns over debt covenant or private lending agreement violations 
(Becker et al. 1998; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994) and LEVE is therefore included to control 
for this effect. Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and Kim et al. (2003), among others, find that firms 
involved in financing transactions tend to engage in earnings management more aggressively 
than those that are not. We include ISSUE to control for the effect. We also include 
AUDCHG because auditor change is related to the magnitude of discretionary accruals 
(DeFond and Subramanyam 1998). 
Discretionary accruals are positively correlated with firm performance (Kasznik 1999; 
Kothari et al. 2005) and it is therefore important to control for the effect of firm performance 
on discretionary accruals. We include CFO in Eq. (4) to address this problem. We include 
lagged total accruals (LAGACCR) to control for variations in the reversal of accruals over 
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time. STD_CFO and STD_REV are included because Hribar and Nichols (2007) suggest that 
using absolute discretionary accruals as the dependent variable potentially biases the test in 
favor of rejecting the null hypothesis of no earnings management and that adding these two 
volatility measures as additional controls substantially improves test specifications. Finally, 
we include industry and year dummies to control for possible variations in accounting 
standards and regulations across industries and over years. 
 
SAMPLE, DATA, AND UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
Sample and Data Sources 
We obtain audit (and non-audit) fee data from the Compustat audit fees file. We 
retrieve all other financial data from the Compustat Industrial Annual File. After extracting 
information on auditor identity and auditor changes from Compustat, we verify its accuracy 
by referring to the information recorded in actual 10-K or 8-K reports.12 The sample period 
for this study is restricted to the four-year period from 2000 to 2003. It begins in 2000 
because Compustat includes audit and non-audit fee data from 2000 and it ends in 2003 
because the adoption of Section 404 of the SOX by accelerated filers in 2004 introduces 
unnecessary noise in the measurement of abnormal audit fees.13 We exclude 2,081 firm-year 
observations for financial institutions and utilities, their SIC codes being 6000–6999 and 
4900–4999, respectively. Our full sample, which has all the data required for our main 
analysis (which excludes STD_CFO and STD_REV), consists of 9,815 firm-years over the 
four-year sample period (1,641, 2,881, 3,004, and 2,289 for fiscal years 2000, 2001, 2002, 
                                                 
12 In case of discrepancies between the Compustat file and the 10-K and 8-K reports, we rely on the information 
recorded in the latter. We also retrieve the information on RESTATE and REPORTABLE from 10-K and 8-K 
reports. 
13 Anecdotal evidence indicates that there was a substantial increase in audit fees in 2004 for accelerated filers 
(U.S. public firms with market float higher than $75 million) due to compliance with Section 404. Furthermore, 
Raghunandan and Rama (2006) find that the audit fees in 2004 were significantly higher for clients with internal 
control weakness.  
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and 2003, respectively). We also construct a reduced sample of 7,061 observations that meet 
the data requirements for computing two additional variables, STD_CFO and STD_REV. As 
will be further explained in the following section, we estimate our main regression in Eq. (4) 
with and without these two variables. 
Descriptive Statistics 
With respect to the descriptive statistics presented in Table 1, it is worth noting the 
following. First, the magnitude of unsigned discretionary accruals for our sample firms is, on 
average, about 12 and 16% of lagged total assets when DA1 and DA2, respectively, are used. 
These mean values are significantly larger than the median values, suggesting that the DA 
distributions are skewed. As expected, the mean value of signed discretionary accruals is 
close to zero. Second, the AFEE variable, which is the natural log of audit fees in thousands 
of dollars, and the LNTA variable are reasonably distributed. Third, on average, nearly 43% 
of our sample firms were involved in substantial capital-raising during the last three-year 
period, while about 45% of them pay income taxes for their business operations in non-U.S. 
tax jurisdictions. Fourth, on average, 44% (42%) of our samples experienced a loss in the 
current (prior) fiscal year and 86% of them had their financial statements audited by one of 
the Big 4 auditors. Fifth, nearly 26% of firms had a pension or post-retirement plan, 4% of 
firms restated their financial statements during the current year, and 0.87% of them had 
reportable events. Finally, the distributional properties of other variables are, overall, 
comparable to those reported in other related studies (e.g., Frankel et al. 2002; Ashbaugh et 
al. 2003; Chung and Kallapur 2003; Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant 2005).14  
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE!] 
Estimation of the Normal Audit Fee Model 
                                                 
14 Note in Table 1 that the descriptive statistics for all variables except STD_CFO and STD_REV are computed 
using the full sample of 9,815 observations, while those for STD_CFO and STD_REV are computed using the 
reduced sample of 7,061 observations.  
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Table 2 reports the regression results for our audit fee model. The t values are 
presented on an adjusted basis, using robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity 
and firm-level clustering (Petersen 2009). As shown in Table 2, the explanatory power of the 
model is about 81%, suggesting that our audit fee determinants, taken as a whole, explain a 
significant portion of the variations in audit fees.15 Moreover, all individual coefficients for 
our fee determinants in Eq. (1), except for ISSUE and CHGSALE, are highly significant with 
predicted signs. In short, the regression results in Table 2 strongly suggest that the estimated 
parameters of our audit fee model can be used reliably for estimating normal audit fees. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE!] 
Using the estimated coefficients of our audit fee model in Table 2, we compute the 
fitted values of audit fees, that is, our measure of normal audit fees. We then obtain the 
abnormal audit fee (ABAFEE) as the difference between AFEE and normal audit fees. Among 
9,815 observations, 4,909 observations are classified as having positive values of ABAFEE, 
whereas the remaining 4,906 observations are classified as having negative values of 
ABAFEE. The mean or median value of ABAFEE is zero and the first and third quartile 
breaks are -0.3120 and 0.3139, respectively, which suggests that the interquartile range is 
0.6259. When we convert the log value into the dollar value and the normal audit fee is set as 
its mean value of $277,078, the interquartile range is $176,435.16 
Correlation Matrix 
                                                 
15  Our model provides a relatively higher explanatory power than the models used in prior studies. For 
comparison, the explanatory powers of the study of Ashbaugh et al. (2003) are 60% for audit fees and 72% for 
the total fee model. Larcker and Richardson (2004) determine their audit fees at 75% and Sankaraguruswamy 
and Whisenant’s (2005) are between 80 and 81%. We also try cross-sectional industry-specific estimations for 
the model, which result in even higher explanatory powers for some industries (76–88%). However, because the 
final results for Eq. (4) using the abnormal audit fees from these industry-specific estimations are almost 
identical to those reported in this study, we have decided not to tabulate or explain the results separately. 
16 If we use deflated values of abnormal fees, the abnormal fees are 71% (135%) of actual audit fees at the first 
(third) quartile break. 
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Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the research variables included in 
Eq. (4), except for STD_CFO and STD_REV. Our measures of absolute discretionary accruals 
(i.e., |DA1| and |DA2|) are highly correlated with each other (ρ = 0.58). The two signed 
measures of discretionary accruals (i.e., DA1 and DA2) are also highly correlated (ρ = 0.52).  
ABAFEE is not significantly correlated to either |DA1|, |DA2|, or DA2, but positively 
correlated with DA1. In addition, most of the control variables in Eq. (4) are significantly 
related to our discretionary accrual measures, suggesting the need to control for their effects 
in the multivariate analyses. For example, smaller firms, clients of non-Big 4 auditors, firms 
with low book-to-market ratio, firms with high sales changes, loss firms, highly levered firms, 
issuing firms, firms that change auditors, firms with low cash flow, and firms with low lagged 
total accruals are associated with a high level of unsigned discretionary accruals. 
In Table 3, we do not report the correlations of STD_CFO and STD_REV with the 
other variables because, as explained earlier, these two variables are measured using the 
reduced sample of 7,061 firm-years. With respect to the correlations statistics using this 
reduced sample, we find that STD_CFO and STD_REV are highly correlated with each other 
(ρ = 0.4116) and not highly correlated with most other control variables, with the highest 
correlation being -0.36 between LNTA and STD_CFO. 
With respect to the structure of correlations among our explanatory variables, it is 
worth noting the following. First, firm size (LNTA) is significantly correlated with BIG4, 
LOSS, and CFO, with ρ = 0.43, -0.33, and 0.34, respectively. This suggests that large firms 
are more likely to hire one of the Big 4 auditors and to have greater cash flows from 
operations while they are less likely to incur a loss, compared with small firms. Finally, 
except for the three previous ones, the correlation coefficients for the other pairs of variables 
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are not large. Overall, the correlation statistics shown in Table 3 indicate that the results of 
our multivariate regressions are unlikely to suffer from multicollinearity problems.17 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE!] 
Univariate Analysis 
 As shown in Table 3, for our full sample, the abnormal audit fee metric (ABAFEE) is 
insignificantly associated with our measure of unsigned discretionary accruals (i.e., |DA1| 
and |DA2|) and correlated with only one measure of signed discretionary accruals (i.e., DA1). 
To further examine if this association differs systematically between clients with positive 
abnormal fees and those with negative abnormal fees, we plot the mean |DA| against 
ABAFEE, with |DA| in the vertical axis and ABAFEE in the horizontal axis, as illustrated in 
Figure 1. In so doing, we group the ABAFEE observations into 14 intervals, which consist of 
12 intervals with the same interval range of 0.15 from -0.9 to 0.9 and two additional intervals 
into which all observations with ABAFEE < -0.9 (leftmost side in Figure 1) and ABAFEE > 
0.9 (rightmost side in Figure 1) are assigned. We then compute the mean value of |DA| for 
observations belonging to each interval and plot the |DA| values against the mid-point of 
ABAFEE for each interval.18 We do not report the distributions of our signed discretionary 
accrual measures (i.e., DA1 and DA2) separately because we fail to find any significant trends 
in their distributions. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE!] 
 As illustrated in Figure 1, the magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals increases 
as ABAFEE increases from zero; however, there is no clear trend when ABAFEE decreases 
from zero. Overall, the association is much stronger for clients with positive abnormal fees 
                                                 
17 In performing regression analyses, we measure the variance inflation factor (VIF) values to examine potential 
multicollinearity problems. Though not reported, none of the VIF values are high enough to cause such a 
problem.  
18 We calculate the mean values after removing a few outliers with |DA| > 1 to remove their undue influence. 
 19
than for those with negative abnormal fees, suggesting that the association between abnormal 
audit fee and audit quality is conditioned upon the sign of abnormal audit fees.19 
 We compare client characteristics between the subsamples with ABAFEE > 0 and 
with ABAFEE < 0 to see if any systematic differences exist between the two. Though not 
tabulated here for brevity, we find that firms with positive abnormal audit fees are slightly 
larger (in terms of LNTA) than the firms with negative abnormal fees (12.29 versus 12.17, t = 
2.98). However, they are not significantly different in terms of ROA (-0.09 versus -0.10, t = 
0.27), LEVE (0.48 versus 0.48, t = 0.51), LOSS (0.44 versus 0.45, t = -0.94), CFO (0.01 
versus 0.01, t = -0.12), or Zmijewski’s (1984) financial distress score (-1.06 versus –1.00, t = 
-0.74). We also conduct Wilcoxon’s z test for median differences between the two 
subsamples and find that the results of these nonparametric tests are in line with those of 
parametric t tests. The only exception is that the median difference in LNTA is insignificant (z 
= 1.51). In short, we find no evidence suggesting that clients with positive abnormal fees 
differ systematically from those with negative abnormal fees in terms of their risk 
characteristics and operating performance. 
Similarly, because Figure 1 suggests that the results are mostly driven by those firms 
with a relatively high value of ABAFEE, we divide the observations having positive ABAFEE 
into two subsamples based on the median value of ABAFEE (0.31) and compare several firm 
characteristics among the two subsamples. We find that firms with above-median positive 
ABAFEE are larger than those with below-median positive ABAFEE (12.41 versus 12.17, t = 
3.86, z = 3.24). Except for firm size, however, both the t and Wilcoxon z tests show no 
                                                 
19 Although not tabulated here for simplicity, we perform both the t test and the Wilcoxon z test to compare the 
values of the absolute discretionary accruals depending on the level of ABAFEE. If we divide the subsample 
firms with positive ABAFEE into two groups based on the median value of ABAFEE (0.31), the two groups 
show significant differences in the magnitude of the absolute discretionary accruals. If we divide the subsample 
firms into four groups based on quartile value, the difference between the first and fourth quartiles is also 
significant. In contrast, when we perform similar tests with the subsample firms with negative ABAFEE, there 
are no statistical differences in any comparisons. These univariate results provide evidence corroborating the 
asymmetry of the fee–quality relation, depending on the sign of abnormal audit fees.  
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significant difference in ROA, LEVE, LOSS, CFO, or Zmijewski’s (1984) financial distress 
score between the two subsamples. This suggests that the asymmetric effect of abnormal 
audit fees on audit quality conditional upon the sign of the abnormal audit fees, depicted in 
Figure 1, is unlikely to be driven by differences in such firm characteristics as risk and 
profitability between firms with relatively high positive AFAFEE and those with relatively 
low positive ABAFEE. 
 
RESULTS OF MULTIVARIATE TESTS 
We first estimate Eq. (4) using the full sample of 9,815 firm-years, which includes 
observations with both positive and negative abnormal fees. Sections A and B of Table 4 
show the regression results using DA1 and DA2, respectively, as the dependent variable. In 
both of the sections, the first three columns use unsigned (absolute) discretionary accruals as 
the dependent variable while the last column uses signed discretionary accruals. Throughout 
this paper, reported t values are on an adjusted basis, using robust standard errors corrected 
for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering (Petersen 2009). 
As shown in columns (1a) and (1b), when Eq. (4) is estimated without reference to the 
sign of abnormal audit fees (i.e., without including POS_ABAF and POS_ABAF*ABAFEE), 
the coefficient of ABAFEE is insignificant, consistent with our prediction. This insignificant 
coefficient of ABAFEE is in line with the findings of Ashbaugh et al. (2003), who report an 
insignificant (or weakly significant) coefficient for their audit fee metric, whereas it is 
inconsistent with the findings of Frankel et al. (2002). Note that neither study subjects its 
analyses to the sign of abnormal audit fees. 
As shown in the last three columns of Sections A and B of Table 4, when Eq. (4) is 
estimated after including POS_ABAF and POS_ABAF*ABAFEE (i.e., the effect on the audit 
quality is conditioned on the sign of abnormal audit fees), we find the results to be strikingly 
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different from those reported in columns (1a) and (1b). In both columns (2a) and (2b), the 
coefficients of ABAFEE are insignificant but the coefficients of the interaction term, 
POS_ABAF*ABAFEE, are significant at less than the one percent level. Note here that the 
coefficient of ABAFEE captures the marginal effect of abnormal audit fees on audit quality 
for client firms with negative abnormal fees, while the sum of the coefficients of ABAFEE 
and POS_ABAF*ABAFEE captures the same effect for those with positive abnormal fees. 
Since the results reported in columns (2a) and (2b) are qualitatively identical, let us 
discuss the results reported in column (2a) as an example. The coefficient of ABAFEE is 
insignificant (0.0376, t = -1.60), indicating that the marginal effect of abnormal audit fees on 
absolute discretionary accruals is insignificant for firms with ABAFEE < 0. This suggests that 
abnormal audit fees have no significant impact on audit quality for client firms with negative 
abnormal audit fees. In contrast, the coefficient of POS_ABAF*ABAFEE in column (2a) is 
significantly positive (0.0655, t = 2.57). Furthermore, the sum of the coefficients of ABAFEE 
and POS_ABAF*ABAFEE is 0.0279 (= -0.0376 + 0.0655), which is significantly different 
from zero (F = 5.45, p = 0.0197). These results are consistent with our prediction that the 
association between abnormal audit fees and audit quality is asymmetric and nonlinear, 
depending on the sign of abnormal audit fees. The results support the view that abnormally 
high audit fees (or positive abnormal fees) can create incentives for auditors to acquiesce to 
client pressure for substandard reporting and thus erode audit quality, while abnormally low 
audit fees (or negative abnormal fees) do not. 
Columns (3a) and (3b) of Table 4 show the results of regressions with STD_CFO and 
STD_REV included, as suggested by Hribar and Nichols (2007). Note that the regressions are 
estimated using a reduced sample of 7,061 firm-years. We find that these reduced-sample 
results in columns (3a) and (3b) are qualitatively identical to the full-sample results in 
columns (2a) and (2b). In column (3a), for example, the coefficient of ABAFEE is 
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insignificant (-0.0175, t = -1.64), the coefficient of POS_ABAF*ABAFEE is significantly 
positive (0.0406, t = 2.44), and the sum of the coefficients of ABAFEE and 
POS_ABAF*ABAFEE is significantly different from zero (F = 3.30, p = 0.0693). 
 As presented in columns (4a) and (4b), when Eq. (4) is estimated using signed 
discretionary accruals as the dependent variable, the coefficients of both ABAFEE and 
POS_ABAF*ABAFEE are insignificant or, at best, marginally significant. Furthermore, we 
find that the sum of these two coefficients is insignificant as well in both columns. To obtain 
more insight into these results, we partition our sample with positive abnormal fees into two 
subsamples: (1) one with income-increasing accruals (denoted as the DA+ subsample) and 
(2) the other with income-decreasing accruals (denoted as the DA- subsample). We then re-
estimate Eq. (4) for each subsample. In so doing we apply the truncated regression procedure 
because the dependent variable is truncated at zero (Chen et al. 2008). Though not tabulated 
here, when DA1 is used as the dependent variable, the coefficient of POS_ABAF*ABAFEE is 
significantly positive (0.1045, z = 1.80) for the DA+ subsample while it is significantly 
negative (-0.1310, z = -2.16) for the DA- subsample.20 These results suggest that as positive 
abnormal fees increase, auditors tend to allow more earnings management, irrespective of 
whether its direction is income increasing or income decreasing; it appears that the direction 
of earnings management associated with positive abnormal fees is not one-sided. 
 [INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE!] 
The results presented in Table 4, taken as a whole, suggest that the association 
between abnormal audit fees and audit quality differs systematically between clients with 
positive and negative abnormal fees. In short, the association between abnormal audit fees 
and audit quality is asymmetric and nonlinear, in that it is conditioned upon the sign of 
                                                 
20 We obtain similar results when DA2 is used as the dependent variable. 
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abnormal audit fees. Our results also imply that abnormally high audit fees can be an 
important source of economic forces that drive the economic bond between auditors and their 
client firms and that the insignificant fee–quality associations reported in previous research 
could be due, at least in part, to their failure to take into account this asymmetric nonlinearity. 
 
FURTHER ANALYSES 
Robustness Checks 
We perform a variety of sensitivity analyses to examine the robustness of our 
findings. Because the results using |DA1| are, overall, qualitatively similar to those using 
|DA2|, for brevity we report only the results using |DA1|. We do not report the results of 
regressions that use signed discretionary accruals as a dependent variable because the 
variables of interests are found to be insignificant in these regressions. 
First, we re-estimate the regressions in Table 4 using a percentage measure of 
abnormal audit fees, that is, the abnormal fees deflated by total audit fees. The results of 
using this alternative measure are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 4. 
Second, our sample period (2000–2003) includes the year of the 2001 Enron debacle, 
the subsequent Andersen collapse, and the passage of the SOX in 2002. In an attempt to 
control for the potential effects of these time-specific factors on our regression results, we 
include year dummies in Eq. (4), as reported in Table 4. To further check whether our results 
are sensitive to these year-specific events, we also estimate both Eq. (1) and Eq. (4) for each 
sample year (without including year dummies). The results of annual regressions are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 4 for all years except 2000 in which the 
coefficients of the variable of interests are insignificant. 
Third, to examine whether the regression results reported in Table 4 are driven by the 
outliers, we perform various additional analyses, including median regressions and ordinary 
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least squares regressions after eliminating extreme tail observations that fall in the first and 
99th percentiles of the variable distribution. We find that the results reported in Table 4 are 
robust to potential problems associated with outliers. 
Fourth, we consider an additional control variable, “client importance” (Chung and 
Kallapur 2003), which is measured as audit fees paid to an auditor in a year divided by that 
auditor’s total audit revenue in the same year. We find that our main results are still robust 
even after adding the client importance measure in Eq. (4). Moreover, when we estimate Eq. 
(4) after adding the total NAS fee or abnormal NAS fee to control for their potential effects 
on the discretionary accruals, our main results are qualitatively unchanged.  
Fifth, to check whether our findings remain similar to a cleaner and more 
homogenous class of audit clients, we repeat the main analyses after removing samples that 
(1) experience recent auditor changes (in the current or previous year), (2) are clients of non-
Big 4 auditors, or (3) restate financial statements. In so doing, we remove all related variables 
from Eqs. (1) and (4),  and then, reestimate the two equations using these reduced samples. 
Although the sample size decreases (minimum sample size is 7,486 when we remove all 
observations classified as (1), (2), or (3)), the results are qualitatively similar to those 
reported in Table 4. 
Finally, we examine whether audit quality is further deteriorated when auditors 
receive persistently positive abnormal audit fees over multiple years. We expect to observe 
higher levels of absolute discretionary accruals when abnormal audit fees are persistently 
positive over multiple years than when abnormal fees are only temporarily positive in a 
certain year. Among our sample firms for which two consecutive years’ data are available, 
about 44% (25%) pay positive (negative) abnormal audit fees over two consecutive years. We 
divide the sample firms with ABAFEE > 0 over two consecutive years into two groups based 
on the median value of positive ABAFEE. We find that the mean absolute discretionary 
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accruals (|DA1|) for firms that report a positive ABAFEE above the median in both years t - 1 
and t (i.e., the subsample with more persistent positive ABAFEE) is 0.1355, whereas it is 
0.1112 for firms that report a positive ABAFEE above the median in year t - 1 and report 
another positive ABAFEE but below the median in year t (i.e., for the subsample of less 
persistent positive abnormal audit fees). This |DA1| difference between the two subsamples is 
significant at the one percent level, suggesting that the firms with a persistently positive 
ABAFEE over multiple years are allowed to engage in opportunistic earnings management to 
a greater extent than those with just a temporarily positive ABAFEE. 
NAS and Total Fees 
When examining the issue of auditors’ fee dependence, previous studies focus their 
attention on the amount and/or the relative importance of NAS fees or total fees rather than 
audit fees (e.g., Huang et al. 2007). While the focus of our study is on abnormal audit fees, 
we re-estimate Eq. (4) using abnormal NAS fees (ABNAFEE) and abnormal total fees 
(ABTFEE) as the dependent variable to provide further insight into the issue. The results for 
ABNAFEE and ABTFEE are reported in Sections A and B, respectively, of Table 5. We 
tabulate only the results using DA1 as the dependent variable because those using DA2 are 
qualitatively similar. 
In Section A of Table 5, we compute ABNAFEE using procedures similar to those 
used for abnormal audit fees. We first estimate Eq. (1) using the natural log of NAS fees 
(instead of audit fees) as the dependent variable. We then obtain abnormal NAS fees (i.e., 
ABNAFEE) by subtracting fitted values of NAS fees from the natural log of actual NAS fees. 
We then estimate Eq. (4) after replacing ABAFEE and POS_ABAF with ABNAFEE and 
POS_ABNAF, respectively, where POS_ABNAF is an indicator variable that equals 1 if 
ABNAFEE > 0 and 0 otherwise. As shown in columns (1a) and (2a) of Table 5, the 
coefficients of both ABNAFEE and POS_ABNAF*ABNAFEE are insignificant, suggesting 
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that there is no asymmetric nonlinearity in the association between abnormal NAS fees and 
audit quality. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE!] 
In Section B of Table 5, we first estimate Eq. (1) using the natural log of the total fees 
(instead of the audit fees) as the dependent variable. We then obtain the abnormal total fees, 
that is, ABTFEE, by subtracting the fitted values of the total fees from the natural log of the 
actual total fees. In Section B, POS_ABTF is an indicator variable that equals 1 if ABTFEE > 
0 and 0 otherwise. We then estimate Eq. (4) after replacing ABAFEE and POS_ABAF with 
ABTFEE and POS_ABTF, respectively. As shown in columns (1b) and (2b) of Table 5, the 
coefficients on both ABTFEE and POS_ABTF*ABTFEE are insignificant or only marginally 
significant, suggesting that the asymmetric and nonlinear association is due in large part to 
abnormal audit fees rather than abnormal NAS fees. The lack of asymmetric relation between 
abnormal NAS fees and audit quality is in line with the findings of several previous studies 
(e.g., Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Chung and Kallapur 2003; DeFond et al. 2002; Ruddock et al. 
2006), which fail to find a significant association between various measures of NAS fees and 
audit quality.21 In short, the results reported in Tables 4 and 5, taken together, suggest that the 
asymmetric fee–quality association is significant when the economic bond of auditors to their 
clients is measured by abnormal audit fees but that the association is insignificant, or at best 
weakly significant, when it is measured by abnormal NAS fees or total fees. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
                                                 
21 A possible reason for these insignificant results is that the estimation of the normal level of non-audit fees is 
noisier than the estimation of normal audit fees. Unlike audit services, the nature of NAS is not homogeneous 
across different auditors and clients. Thus, the large noise term in the estimated abnormal NAS fees could drive 
the insignificant results in our regression analyses. For example, the explanatory power (adjusted R2) of the 
NAS fee estimation model is 0.66, which is significantly lower than that of the audit fee model reported in Table 
2 (0.81). Similarly, when Ashbaugh et al. (2003, 619) investigate the determinants of various auditor fees by 
regressing auditors’ fee metrics on a group of determinants, the adjusted R2 of the non-audit fee model (0.34) or 
NAS fee ratio model (0.28) is much lower than that of the audit fee model (0.66) or total audit fee model (0.68). 
DeFond et al. (2002), Higgs and Skantz (2006), and Krishnan et al. (2005) show similar results as well.  
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In this paper, we predict that auditors’ incentives to compromise audit quality differ 
systematically between two distinct situations, when audit fees are above an auditor’s 
expectation of the normal fee level and when they are below. If auditors receive more than 
the normal level of fees from their clients, their benefits from retaining these profitable 
clients can outweigh the costs associated with allowing substandard reporting. We therefore 
predict that abnormal audit fees are negatively (positively) associated with audit quality (the 
magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals) for clients with positive abnormal audit fees. 
However, when audit fees are below the normal level, auditors may have few (or relatively 
weak) incentives to compromise audit quality. We therefore predict that the fee–quality 
association is likely to be asymmetric and nonlinear, depending on whether auditors receive 
abnormally high or abnormally low audit fees. We provide empirical evidence consistent 
with these predictions. We find that the association between abnormal audit fees and audit 
quality is asymmetric and nonlinear in the sense that the association is conditioned upon the 
sign of abnormal audit fees. Our results are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks. 
Our study provides useful insight into current regulatory debates on the auditor’s 
economic dependence on the client and helps us better understand reasons why previous 
research provides mixed evidence on the association between various fee metrics and the 
extent of earnings management. If the association between abnormal fees and the magnitude 
of discretionary accruals is conditioned on the sign of abnormal fees, examining the 
association without reference to the sign of abnormal fees most likely leads us to observe 
insignificant associations, as also reported in most previous studies. This study’s findings 
suggest that future research on similar issues should take into account the asymmetric 
nonlinearity in the fee–quality relation. 
We limit our sample period to the four-year period 2000–2003 to control for the 
potential confounding effects of the disclosures of internal control quality (ICQ) under 
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Sections 302 and 404 of the SOX, which became effective in 2004, on our results. Given that 
these disclosure regulations can significantly change the structure of audit fees, it would be 
interesting to investigate whether and how the ICQ disclosure requirements influence the 
asymmetric association between abnormal audit fees and audit quality. We leave this 
question to future research.  
[INSERT APPENDIX ABOUT HERE!] 
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APPENDIX 
Description of variables 
 
The below summarizes the variables used in the audit fee expectation model (i.e., Eq. (1)) 
and the model for the asymmetric association between abnormal audit fees and audit quality 
(i.e., Eq. (4)).  
 
Variables  Description 
AFEE = natural log of actual fees paid to auditors for their financial statement 
audits (i.e., audit fees) in thousands of dollars. 
 
LNTA = natural log of total assets (Data6) in thousands of dollars. 
 
NBS = natural log of 1 plus the number of business segments. 
 
NGS = natural log of 1 plus the number of geographic segments. 
 
INVREC   = inventory (Data3) and receivables (Data2) divided by total assets. 
 
EMPLOY = square root of the number of employees (Data29). 
 
ISSUE = 1 if the sum of long-term debt (Data111) or equity (Data108) issued during 
the past three years is more than 5% of the total assets and 0 otherwise. 
 
FOREIGN = 1 if the firm pays any foreign income tax (Data64) and 0 otherwise. 
 
EXORD = 1 if the firm reports any extraordinary gains or losses (Data48) and 0 
otherwise. 
 
LOSS   = 1 if the firm reported a loss during the year and 0 otherwise. 
 
LOSSLAG = 1 if the firm reported a loss during the prior year and 0 otherwise. 
 
LEVE = leverage (total liabilities (Data181) divided by total assets). 
 
ROA   = return on assets (income before extraordinary items (Data18) divided by 
average total assets). 
 
LIQUID = current assets (Data4) divided by current liabilities (Data5). 
 
BIG4 = 1 if the auditor is one of the Big 4 and 0 otherwise. 
 
SHORT_TEN = 1 if the auditor is in the first or second year of the audit engagement and 0 
otherwise. 
 
BTM = book-to-market ratio (Data60/(Data25*Data199)), winsorized at 0 and 4. 
 
CHGSALE = sales (Data12) change from the prior year divided by the prior year’s 
beginning total assets. 
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PENSION = 1 if the firm has a pension or post-retirement plan and 0 otherwise. 
 
REPORT_LAG = number of days between the current fiscal year end and the annual 
earnings announcement date. 
 
RESTATE = 1 if the firm restates net income or assets for reasons other than accounting 
method changes or adoptions of new standards and 0 otherwise. 
 
REPORTABLE = 1 if the auditor change announcement disclosed in Form 8-K contains 
reportable events or disagreements between the auditor and the client firm 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
DA = discretionary accruals. DA1 is discretionary accruals as measured by Ball 
and Shivakumar’s (2006) method; DA2 is discretionary accruals as 
measured by the modified Jones model and adjusted for firm performance 
(Kothari et al. 2005). 
 
ABAFEE = abnormal audit fees estimated from Eq. (1). 
 
POS_ABAF = 1 if the firm has positive abnormal fees (ABAFEE > 0) and 0 otherwise. 
 
AUDCHG = 1 if the firm’s auditor is in the first year of an audit engagement and 0 
otherwise. 
 
CFO = cash flow from operations (Data308) divided by lagged total assets. 
 
LAGACCR = one-year lagged total accruals (deflated by total assets at the end of the 
previous fiscal year) . 
 
STD_CFO = standard deviations of operating cash flow (deflated by lagged total assets) 
for the years t - 5 to t. 
 
STD_REV = standard deviations of cash-based revenues (sales + ∆accounts receivable 
(Data302)) (deflated by lagged total assets) for the years t - 5 to t. 
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Figure 1 
Distribution of the Magnitude of Absolute Discretionary Accruals 
Categorized by the Abnormal Audit Fees 
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In the Figure 1, we plot the mean unsigned discretionary accruals (i.e., |DA1| and |DA2|) against abnormal 
audit fees (ABAFEE,), with |DA| in the vertical axis and ABAFEE in the horizontal axis. We group the 
ABAFEE observations into 14 intervals, which consist of 12 intervals with the same interval range of 0.15 from 
-0.9 to 0.9 and two additional intervals into which all observations with ABAFEE < -0.9 (leftmost side) and 
ABAFEE > 0.9 (rightmost side) are assigned. We then compute the mean value of |DA| for observations 
belonging to each interval and plot the |DA| values against the mid-point of ABAFEE for each interval. 
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Table 1 
Distributions of Variables 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1% 50% 99% 
│DA1│ 0.1223 0.2853 0.0005 0.0539 1.0120 
│DA2│ 0.1630 0.2779 0.0015 0.0872 1.2171 
DA1 0.0073 0.3103 -0.6787 0.0078 0.7669 
DA2 -0.0170 0.3218 -0.9851 -0.0054 0.8018 
AFEE 5.6238 1.1540  3.2923 5.4848 8.8818 
LNTA 12.2309 2.0404 7.6967 12.2058 17.0875 
NBS 0.9924 0.4612 0 0.6931 2.0794 
NGS 0.9776 0.6216 0 1.0986 2.3026 
INVREC 0.2770 0.1905 0 0.2521 0.7863 
EMPLOY 55.9022 70.9834 2.8284 30.9516 352.1363 
ISSUE 0.4269 - 0 0 1 
FOREIGN 0.4548 - 0 0 1 
EXORD 0.2148 - 0 0 1 
LOSS 0.4417 - 0 0 1 
LOSSLAG 0.4163 - 0 0 1 
LEVE 0.4816 0.3129 0.0416 0.4452 1.8538 
ROA -0.0941 0.3902 -1.5136 0.0173 0.3017 
LIQUID 3.3895 4.3848 0.2666 2.1702 22.3860 
BIG4 0.8646 - 0 1 1 
SHORT_TEN 0.1993  - 0 0 1 
BTM 0.7000 0.7293 0 0.4814 4 
CHGSALE 0.0790  0.3894 -0.9172 0.0389 1.4817 
PENSION 0.2572 - 0 0 1 
REPORT_LAG 49.3504 23.1130 16 44 106 
RESTATE 0.0409 - 0 0 1 
REPORTABLE 0.0087 - 0 0 0 
AUDCHG 0.1019 - 0 0 1 
CFO 0.0121 0.3165 -1.1632 0.0722 0.4696 
LAGACCR -0.1396 0.7686 -1.4810 -0.0717 0.3814 
STD_CFO 0.1273 0.1872 0.0122 0.0746 1.2333 
STD_REV 0.3702 0.4021 0.0268 0.2462 2.6940 
 
See the Appendix for the definitions of variables.  
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Table 2 
Estimation of Normal Audit Fees 
 
 
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign
Coefficient 
(t-value)
LNTA + 0.4124 (48.09***) 
NBS + 0.1012 (5.22***) 
NGS + 0.1372 (8.96***) 
INVREC + 0.3490 (7.46***) 
EMPLOY + 0.0017 (6.82***) 
ISSUE + 0.0190 (1.49) 
FOREIGN + 0.2265 (11.25***) 
EXORD + 0.1251 (8.43***) 
LOSS + 0.0624 (4.21***) 
LOSSLAG + 0.1429 (10.32***) 
LEVE + 0.1289 (4.20***) 
ROA - -0.1946 (-7.51***) 
LIQUID - -0.0190 (-9.97***) 
BIG4 + 0.2057 (8.11***) 
SHORT_TEN - -0.1138 (-5.80***) 
BTM - -0.0508 (-5.23***) 
CHGSALE + -0.0238 (-1.40) 
PENSION + 0.1281 (5.33***) 
REPORT_LAG + 0.0038 (8.92***) 
RESTATE + 0.1863 (5.71***) 
REPORTABLE + 0.1628 (2.42**)
Constant 
 ? 
-0.0676 
(-0.66) 
Industry and year dummies  Included 
N  9,815 
R2  0.8098 
All t-statistics in parentheses are on an adjusted basis, using robust standard errors corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering (Petersen 2009). ** and *** denotes p-value<5% and p-value<1%, 
respectively with two-tailed tests. See the Appendix for the definitions of variables.  
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Table 3 
Pearson Correlations among Regression Variables 
 
 │DA 1│ │DA 2│ DA 1 DA 2 ABAFEE LNTA BIG4 BTM CHGSALE LOSS LEVE ISSUE AUDCHG CFO 
│DA 2│ 0.5848 
(<0.001) 
             
DA 1 -0.3825 
(<0.001) 
-0.1524 
(<0.001) 
            
DA 2 -0.1452 
(<0.001) 
-0.1043 
(<0.001) 
0.5233 
(<0.001) 
           
ABAFEE -0.0072 
(0.4736) 
0.0094 
(0.3503) 
0.0347 
(<0.001) 
-0.0000 
(0.9994)  
          
LNTA -0.1819 
(<0.001) 
-0.2165 
(<0.001) 
-0.0553 
(<0.001) 
-0.1152 
(<0.001) 
-0.0004 
(0.9721) 
         
BIG4 -0.0765 
(<0.001) 
-0.0957 
(<0.001) 
-0.0354 
(0.0005) 
-0.0860 
(<0.001) 
0.0025 
(0.8035) 
0.4313 
(<0.001) 
        
BTM -0.0626 
(<0.001) 
-0.0878 
(<0.001) 
-0.0303 
(0.0027) 
0.0145 
(0.1495) 
0.0012 
(0.9024) 
-0.0805 
(<0.001) 
-0.0834 
(<0.001) 
       
CHGSALE 0.0956 
(<0.001) 
0.0945 
(<0.001) 
0.0576 
(<0.001) 
0.0251 
(0.0128) 
-0.0027 
(0.7869) 
0.0621 
(<0.001) 
0.0198 
(0.0503) 
-0.1785 
(<0.001) 
      
LOSS 0.1632 
(<0.001) 
0.1766 
(<0.001) 
-0.1576 
(<0.001) 
-0.0190 
(0.0603) 
-0.0017 
(0.8670) 
-0.3287 
(<0.001) 
-0.0852 
(<0.001) 
0.1143 
(<0.001) 
-0.2045 
(<0.001) 
     
LEVE 0.0270 
(0.0074) 
0.0467 
(<0.001) 
-0.0418 
(<0.001) 
-0.0074 
(0.4648) 
-0.0016 
(0.8710) 
0.0891 
(<0.001) 
-0.0772 
(<0.001) 
-0.1232 
(<0.001) 
-0.0640 
(<0.001) 
0.0571 
(<0.001) 
    
ISSUE 0.0866 
(<0.001) 
0.1046 
(<0.001) 
0.0019 
(0.8544) 
0.0238 
(0.0183) 
-0.0030 
(0.7701) 
0.0128 
(0.2038) 
-0.0046 
(0.6481) 
-0.1405 
(<0.001) 
0.1424 
(<0.001) 
0.0740 
(<0.001) 
0.1846 
(<0.001) 
   
AUDCHG 0.0190 
(0.0602) 
0.0082 
(0.4174) 
-0.0215 
(0.0335) 
0.0105 
(0.2963) 
-0.0084 
(0.4067) 
-0.0946 
(<0.001) 
-0.1305 
(<0.001) 
0.0347 
(0.0006) 
-0.0566 
(<0.001) 
0.0382 
(0.0002) 
0.0586 
(<0.001) 
-0.0122 
(0.2273) 
  
CFO -0.3091 
(<0.001) 
-0.4138 
(<0.001) 
 -0.0533 
(<0.001) 
-0.2879 
(<0.001) 
-0.0063 
(0.5341) 
0.3388 
(<0.001) 
0.1016 
(<0.001) 
0.0543 
(<0.001) 
0.0823 
(<0.001) 
-0.4350 
(<0.001) 
-0.0604 
(<0.001) 
-0.1878 
(<0.001) 
-0.0270 
(0.0074) 
 
LAGACCR -0.1115 
(<0.001) 
-0.1224 
(<0.001) 
0.0967 
(<0.001) 
0.0712 
(<0.001) 
-0.0051 
(0.6117) 
0.0439 
(<0.001) 
0.0091 
(0.3696) 
0.0213 
(0.0350) 
-0.0242 
(0.0164) 
-0.0923 
(<0.001) 
-0.0246 
(0.0148) 
-0.0277 
(0.0061) 
-0.0030 
(0.7670) 
0.0784 
(<0.001) 
Two-tailed p-values are presented in parentheses. ABAFEE is abnormal audit fees. See the Appendix for the definitions of variables. 
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Table 4 
Empirical Results on the Association between Discretionary Accruals and Abnormal Audit Fees 
 
 Section A Section B
Dependent 
Variable 
(1a) 
|DA1| 
(2a) 
|DA1| 
(3a) 
|DA1| 
(4a) 
DA1 
(1b) 
|DA2| 
(2b) 
|DA2| 
(3b) 
|DA2| 
(4b) 
DA2 
POS_ABAF  0.0032 
(0.38) 
-0.0032 
(-0.50) 
 
-0.1344 
(-1.41) 
 -0.0082 
(-1.05) 
-0.0064 
(-0.96) 
0.0185 
(1.94*) 
ABAFEE -0.0051 
(-0.57) 
 
-0.0376 
(-1.60) 
-0.0175 
(-1.64) 
 
0.0450 
(1.79*) 
0.0044 
(0.79) 
-0.0107 
(-1.03) 
-0.0106 
(-1.45) 
0.0028 
(0.21) 
POS_ABAF 
*ABAFEE 
 0.0655 
(2.57***) 
 
0.0406 
(2.44**) 
-0.0292 
(-1.00) 
 0.0475 
(2.66***) 
0.0434 
(2.81***) 
-0.0428 
(-1.87*) 
LNTA -0.0100 
(-4.31***) 
 
-0.0106 
(-4.83***) 
-0.0072 
(-3.80***) 
 
-0.0123 
(-4.95***) 
-0.0105 
(-4.48***) 
-0.0108 
(-4.58***) 
-0.0098 
(-6.19***) 
-0.0050 
(-1.82*) 
BIG4 -0.0219 
(-2.70***) 
 
-0.0205 
(-2.52**) 
-0.0250 
(-3.11***) 
 
-0.0128 
(-1.30) 
-0.0282 
(-3.17***) 
-0.0272 
(-3.06***) 
-0.0257 
(-2.76***) 
-0.0369 
(-3.15***) 
BTM -0.0096 
(-2.89***) 
 
-0.0093 
(-2.80***) 
-0.0116 
(-3.80***) 
 
-0.0005 
(-0.12) 
-0.0151 
(-4.52***) 
-0.0149 
(-4.45***) 
-0.0157 
(-4.81***) 
0.0174 
(3.94***) 
CHGSALE 0.0822 
(4.38***) 
 
0.0818 
(4.38***) 
0.0276 
(2.09***) 
 
0.0199 
(0.78) 
0.0852 
(6.78***) 
0.0849 
(6.75***) 
0.0260 
(2.14**) 
0.0354 
(1.54) 
LOSS 0.0112 
(1.14) 
 
0.0103 
(1.06) 
-0.0035 
(-0.38) 
 
-0.1463 
(-13.53***) 
-0.0120 
(-0.98) 
-0.0127 
(-1.04) 
-0.0044 
(-0.50) 
-0.1120 
(-8.19***) 
LEVE 0.0265 
(2.18**) 
 
0.0256 
(2.08**) 
0.0195 
(1.64) 
 
-0.0198 
(-1.21) 
0.0346 
(2.57**) 
0.0340 
(2.53**) 
0.0321 
(2.52**) 
-0.0198 
(-1.10) 
ISSUE 0.0043 
(0.77) 
 
0.0038 
(0.67) 
-0.0042 
(-0.66) 
 
-0.0013 
(-0.20) 
0.0013 
(0.22) 
0.0010 
(0.17) 
-0.0008 
(-0.15) 
-0.0153 
(-2.12**) 
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Table 4 
(continued) 
 
        
AUDCHG 0.0085 
(0.55) 
 
0.0072 
(0.47) 
-0.0164 
(-2.92***) 
 
-0.0235 
(-1.52) 
-0.0071 
(-0.89) 
-0.0083 
(-1.04) 
-0.0104 
(-1.45) 
-0.0012 
(-0.12) 
CFO -0.2342 
(-6.07***) 
 
-0.2331 
(-6.05***) 
-0.2327 
(-4.83***) 
 
-0.1301 
(-3.14***) 
-0.3409 
(-5.99***) 
-0.3402 
(-5.95***) 
-0.2049 
(-5.12***) 
-0.3950 
(-6.19***) 
LAGACCR -0.0275 
(-2.23**) 
 
-0.0275 
(-2.24**) 
-0.0060 
(-1.30) 
 
0.0372 
(2.31**) 
-0.0544 
(-2.35**) 
-0.0542 
(-2.36**) 
-0.0151 
(-1.46) 
0.0578 
(2.54**) 
STD_CFO   0.1272 
(3.76***) 
 
   0.1289 
(4.31***) 
 
STD_REV   0.0222 
(1.73*) 
 
   0.0220 
(1.63) 
 
Constant 0.2725 
(10.35***) 
 
0.2650 
(9.01***) 
0.2115 
(8.39***) 
 
0.2722 
(8.16***) 
0.3422 
(14.21***) 
0.3410 
(13.85***) 
0.2835 
(12.88***) 
0.1365 
(4.50***) 
Industry and year 
dummies 
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 9,815 
 
9,815 7,061 
 
9,815 9,815 9,815 7,061 9,815 
 R2 0.1480 
 
0.1492 0.1917 
 
0.0630 0.2259 0.2266 0.1884 0.1316 
All t-statistics in parentheses are on an adjusted basis, using robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering (Petersen 2009). The 
superscripts *, **, and *** denote p < 10%, p < 5%, and p < 1%, respectively, for two-tailed tests. See the Appendix for the definitions of variables. 
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Table 5 
Results of Regressions of |DA1| on Abnormal Non-audit Fees and Abnormal Total Fees 
Section A 
Non-Audit Fee 
Section B 
Total Fee
Dependent 
Variable 
(1a) 
|DA1| 
(2a)
DA1 
Dependent 
Variable 
(1b) 
|DA1| 
(2b) 
DA1 
POS_ABNAF 0.0231 
(2.57**) 
 
-0.0169
(-1.71*) 
POS_ABTF
 
-0.0115
(-1.67*) 
-0.0153
(-1.86*) 
ABNAFEE -0.0015 
(-0.58) 
0.0033
(1.03) 
ABTFEE 0.0069
(0.63) 
0.0120 
(0.98) 
POS_ABNAF 
*ABNAFEE 
 
0.0073 
(0.93) 
-0.0027
(-0.29) 
POS_ABTF*
ABTFEE 
0.0271
(1.88*) 
0.0133 
(0.79) 
LNTA -0.0096 
(-4.17***) 
-0.0129
(-5.01***) 
LNTA -0.0104
(-4.46***) 
-0.0128
(-4.89***) 
BIG4 -0.0217 
(-2.66***) 
-0.0121
(-1.23) 
BIG4 -0.0221
(-2.70***) 
-0.0100
(-1.01) 
BTM -0.0097 
(-2.90***) 
-0.0003
(-0.09) 
BTM -0.0099
(-2.97***) 
-0.0001
(-0.01) 
CHGSALE 0.0822 
(4.39***) 
0.0197
(0.77) 
CHGSALE 0.0842
(4.46***) 
0.0159 
(0.62) 
LOSS 0.0114 
(1.16) 
-0.1469
(-13.42***) 
LOSS 0.0119
(1.21) 
-0.1483
(-13.70***) 
LEVE 0.0258 
(2.12**) 
-0.0198
(-1.21) 
LEVE 0.0257
(2.11**) 
-0.0194
(-1.18) 
ISSUE 0.0039 
(0.70) 
-0.0015
(-0.23) 
ISSUE 0.0045
(0.79) 
-0.0020
(-0.30) 
AUDCHG 0.0078 
(0.48) 
-0.0239
(-1.46) 
AUDCHG 0.0080
(0.52) 
-0.0247
(-1.58) 
CFO -0.2337 
(-6.06***) 
-0.1300
(-3.11***) 
CFO -0.2352
(-6.12***) 
-0.1274
(-3.06***) 
LAGACCR -0.0271 
(-2.21**) 
0.0369
(2.29**) 
LAGACCR -0.0421
(-2.09**) 
0.0598 
(3.43***) 
Constant 
 
0.2514 
(9.37***) 
0.2776
(8.95***) 
Constant
 
0.2779
(10.09***) 
0.2685 
(8.44***) 
Year and 
industry 
dummies 
Included Included Year and
industry 
dummies
Included Included
R2 0.1500 0.0619 R2 0.1461 0.0577 
All t-statistics in parentheses are on an adjusted basis, using robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity 
and firm-level clustering (Petersen 2009). The superscripts *, **, and *** denote p < 10%, p < 5%, and p < 1%, 
respectively, for two-tailed tests. See the Appendix for the definitions of variables. 
